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ARE WE JUST BRAINS? 
 
 
On the face of it, the answer is obviously ‘no’. The ‘we’ refers to members of the species 
Homo sapiens, and those animals are not brains. Yet familiar lines of philosophical reasoning 
raise doubts about this answer. For I could lose my arms and legs without dying. And perhaps 
I could lose the rest, so long as I carried on thinking. If I am thinking ‘oh no, I’ve lost my 
body’, I can hardly be dead. Not if we think of death in the philosophical, rather than clinical, 
sense of a permanent cessation of experience – which should not be thought of as eternal 
darkness, since that would just be more experience. But we are right to employ the 
philosophical sense, since medical ones are simply trying to track it; it is the worry that 
experience may continue after heartbeat and respiration have ceased, for instance, which 
leads doctors to now distinguish clinical from brain death. And brain death must be the key if 
all you need to carry on existing is experience, and all you need for that is brain activity. So 
maybe you are your brain after all. 
 
Even if you think of death as a transition to another kind of experience, you are still thinking 
of experience as what ensures your continued existence. If God decided to terminate your 
heavenly experiences, then you would be dead; absolutely this time. Now of course we are 
animals of a certain kind – just as we are students, accountants, or whatever – but that, 
according to this philosophical way of thinking, is not what we essentially are. And with this 
qualification in place, the idea that we are brains no longer looks so implausible. For brains 
are where the experiencing takes place. They consequently seem to be all that is essential to 




Dualist philosophers have denied this, thinking that experience can take place without a 
brain. We can easily imagine this (try it), and it ties in nicely with the idea of an after-life. 
But it is no longer plausible to think of ourselves as an immaterial mind occupying a body. 
Not now science has shown the dependency of experiences on specific regions of the brain; 
and not after centuries of philosophical criticism of the idea of non-physical interaction with 
the physical. No matter what happens after death, during ordinary life at least, we have more 
than enough reason to deny that we could ever find ourselves thinking, ‘oh no, I’ve lost my 
brain’. So again, we seem to be back with the idea that we are our brains.   
 
The problem, however, is that this only makes sense if consciousness is physical; if 
experiences are brain events. But if you think about an experience, and then a brain event, the 
idea that they are the same seems out of the question. Take a sip of coffee and think about the 
taste experience. Now think about a neural firing in your brain. You will not notice a 
similarity. So saying that the experience and brain event are the same thing, makes about as 
much sense as saying that Barack Obama and the River Vistula are! We have radically 
different conceptions of the president and the river, so it seems obvious they cannot be the 
same thing; and the situation with experiences and brain events is parallel. Perhaps this will 
tempt you to say that brain events cause experiences; but then there are two different things 
causally related. And then you are back with dualism. 
 
This is the problem physicalist philosophy of mind has grappled with since the mid-twentieth 
century. Gilbert Ryle (1949) and U.T. Place (1956) made the original suggestions for a way 
out, and physicalism has ever since consisted in variations on them. The first was that 
experience is an illusion; we judge there are experiences, but all that really exists are the 
judgements. And the second is that our conceptions of experiences are radically inaccurate 
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conceptions of brain events. So the conception you form of the coffee experience is a 
conception of a brain event; it is just very different from the kind you form by observing 
brain-scanning devices.   
 
I used to think something along these lines simply had to be correct, otherwise philosophy 
would be placed in the absurd position of challenging science. So I was committed to a form 
of physicalism. I changed my mind when I realised two things. Firstly, that physicalism can 
be rejected without challenging science; that the rejection could have purely philosophical 
implications. And secondly, that both physicalist proposals are ultimately the same. So given 
that the first is wildly implausible, and I now realised that the second leads to the same place, 
I concluded that consciousness is not physical. But in that case, what is it? 
 
Here is a new way of thinking about it, inspired by an important work that has yet to receive 
the attention it deserves: J.J. Valberg’s Death, Dream, and the Self. Valberg suggests that we 
think of consciousness as the ‘horizon’ within which the world appears, rather than as 
something which appears (such as your coffee experience). Although I take this idea in a 
different direction from Valberg, I think this is the key to the matter. 
 
Suppose you are thinking about the problem of consciousness while dreaming. It would be an 
odd dream; but practically anything can happen in dreams. Suppose, then, that while you are 
dreaming (of sitting in a dreamed-up version of Plato’s Academy, let’s say), you start to think 
about the physicalist position that your experience is a brain event. This will be as baffling as 
if you were awake, but the difference is that if you are dreaming, the idea is obviously 
confused. This is because the brain event you naturally think about would be taking place in 
the brain in the dream; the one in the Academy. But you do not really have a brain in the 
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dream, any more than you have arms and legs – these are all things your consciousness 
‘makes up’. They exist only in the context (‘horizon’) of the dream. There will be a brain 
event within your sleeping head, of course; the one rested on your pillow with eyes tightly 
shut. But that is not the brain event you will be thinking about. You will be thinking about the 
one in the Academy – which is obviously not what your experience really is. 
 
What consciousness seems to do is create a context, with anything real existing outside of 
that context. Thus the real world in which you are asleep is outside the world of the dream. 
Whatever your dreaming experience is, then, must also be outside. But if that is how 
consciousness works in a dream, maybe it works like that in waking life too. If so, what 
experience really amounts to cannot be something inside the context waking consciousness 
creates; the one which contains the entire physical universe. So it cannot be physical. Just as 
the reality of a dream experience is only to be found outside the context of the dream, and 
hence cannot be a dream thing, so the reality of a waking experience is to be found outside 
the context of waking life, and hence cannot be a physical thing. What is it then? It belongs to 
the independently existing reality which we make sense of as experience of a physical world. 
Our conception of the physical world cannot capture the nature of this reality, because it 
cannot incorporate experience; but it nevertheless provides the best conception of it available 
to us. 
 
This talk of something outside of, or beyond, the physical world is bound to bring to mind 
religion. That is why philosophy in the age of modern science has steadfastly avoided it. But 
as I argue in Philosophy in a Meaningless Life, accepting this kernel of truth within our 
religious traditions, for the purposes of solving philosophical problems, is not going to lead 
us to the meaning of life those traditions have sought. Neither will it overturn the scientific 
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world-view. It will only philosophically supplement it; by showing us, for example, that we 
are not just brains. 
